Legislation - Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards by Krueger, Robert B., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 2 
1954 
Legislation - Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards 
Robert B. Krueger S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Legislation Commons, 
and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert B. Krueger S.Ed., Legislation - Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICH. L. REV. 
264 (1954). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
264 MicmcAN LAw RBvmw [ Vol. 53 
LEGISLATION-REQUIREMENT OF DEFINITENESS IN STATUTORY 
STANDARDS-While it is universally recognized that definiteness in 
statutory standards is a condition prerequisite to the application of a 
statute, there is no agreement among either the courts or the writers 
as to the theory behind this requirement. However, common elements 
in each of the two prevalent theories indicate certain factors which may 
well be decisive on the question of definiteness in any given case. The 
purpose of this comment is to explore the practical implications of the 
interplay of these various factors and theories. 
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I. Theories upon which Statutes Are Held Too Indefinite To Be 
Enforced 
A. The Inability of the Courts To Apply the Statutes. Irrespective 
of any constitutional guarantees1 designed for the protection of the 
individual, a statute may be so vague that a court is unable to interpret 
and apply its standards.2 While justification for the court's decision 
may be camouflaged by reference to the doctrine of "separation of 
powers"3 or the common law rule that "criminal statutes are to be strictly 
1 Most writers feel that the requirement of definiteness has become solely a matter 
of constitutional law. While they acknowledge that statutes have been held void for 
indefiniteness regardless of constitutionality, they regard this either as a historical accident 
resulting from incorrect application of the common law rule that criminal statutes should 
be strictly construed or as an anomalous phase in the evolution of the constitutional defi-
niteness doctrine. See 62 HARv. L. Rllv. 77 (1948); 22 So. CAL. L. Rllv. 298 (1949); 
2 ALA. L. Rllv. 301 (1950). But cf. Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General Terms,'' 21 
MxcH. L. Rllv. 831 (1923). See also generally CnAWPoRD, THB CONSTRUCTION OP 
STATUTES §198 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTl!S AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3d 
ed., Horack, §4920 (1943). 
2 State decisions: Johnson v. State, 100 Ala. 32, 14 S. 629 (1894); Ex parte Andrew 
Jackson, 45 Ark. 158 (1885); Blackford v. Gibson, 144 Ark. 240, 222 S.W. 367 (1920); 
Jones v. Lawson, 143 Ark. 83, 220 S.W. 311 (1920); Hallman v. Coker, 147 Ark. 73, 
226 S.W. 1054 (1921); State v. Bryant, 219 Ark. 313, 241 S.W. (2d) 473 (1951); 
Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906); In re Lockett, 179 
Cal. 581, 178 P. 134 (1919); Cook v. State, 26 Ind. App. 278, 59 N.E. 489 (1901); 
Railroad Commission v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 179 Ind. 255, 100 N.E. 852 (1913); State 
v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa 170, 170 N.W. 417 (1919); In re Hendricks, 60 Kan. 796, 57 P. 
965 (1899); State v. Gaitskill, 133 Kan. 389, 300 P. 326 (1931) (in Kansas at that time 
there was a statute providing for invalidation of vague statutes); Matthews v. Murphy, 23 
Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (1901); Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 S. 498 (1917); 
State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S.W. 627 (1900); State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 
(1884); State v. Morrison, 210 N.C. 117, 185 S.E. 674 (1936); State v. Diamond, 27 
N.M. 477, 202 P. 988 (1921); State v. Humble Oil and Relining Co., 55 N.M. 395, 234 
P. (2d) 339 (1951); Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 105 Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426 
(1922); State v. Mann, 2 Ore. 238 (1867); Commonwealth v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 3 W. 
& S. (Pa.) 173 (1842); Wilcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. (2d) 
521 (1947). See also the dicta in People v. Bergotini, 172 Cal. 717, 158 P. 198 (1916); 
Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 P. 330 (1909). 
Federal decisions: The Enterprise, (C.C. N.Y. 1810) 8 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 4,499; 
United States v. Sharp, (C.C. Pa. 1815) 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, No. 16,264; United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Tennessee, 
(C.C. Tenn. 1884) 19 F. 679 (statute also was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution but upon arbitrary discrimination grounds); United States v. 
Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 538 (1891); Tozer v. United States, (C.C. Mo. 1892) 
52 F. 917; Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (1900); James v. Bowman, 190 
U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678 (1903); Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App. D.C. 
443 (1905); United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592 (1910); United 
States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189 (1952). See also United States v. 1010.8 
Acres, (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 120; Varney v. Warehime, (6th Cir. 1945) 147 F. 
(2d) 238. 
3 In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 at 221 (1875), where a criminal statute 
was invalidated for not setting up an applicable standard, it was stated: "We are not able 
to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder •••• This would, to 
some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government." 
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construed,"4 the real rationale would seem to be that it is "impossible 
to solve the doubt and dispel the obscurity"5 of the statute. Indeed, it 
appears that courts have voided statutes not only for vagueness in terms 
but also for inconsistency in terms, impossibility of pei:formance of the 
act prescribed,6 and sometimes apparently even for unreasonableness.7 
The Montana court stated in Hilburn v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.: 
". . . if an act of the legislature is so vague and uncertain in 
its terms as to convey no meaning; or if the means for carrying 
out its provisions are not adequate or effective; or it is so conflicting 
and inconsistent in its provisions that it cannot be executed, it is 
incumbent upon the courts to ·declare it void and inoperative."8 
The doctrine of invalidation for indefiniteness expounded by these 
cases seems to have been derived not from a confused view of the rule 
of strict construction of criminal statutes, as is thought by some writers, 9 
but from the Roman maxim "ibi jus uncertum, ibi jus nullum"-
"where the law is uncertain, there is no law." It is true that many of 
the earlier cases spoke of strict construction in holding a criminal statute 
void, but this certainly does not compel the conclusion that the statutes 
were held void because of a misunderstanding of the construction rule. 
It seems more likely that the courts interpreted the language of the 
statutes strictly and after construing them in this manner held that the 
statutes were not definite and thus were void.10 
However this may be as a theoretical proposition, an exhaustive 
research discloses that in recent years only a few state and federal 
decisions have invalidated a statute on the ground that the statutory 
standard was so vague as to be impossible to interpret. Instead, reliance 
4Tozer v. United States, (C.C. Mo. 1892) 52 F. 917; United States v. Brewer, 139 
U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 538 (1891); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678 (1903); 
The Enterprise, (C.C. N.Y. 1810) 8 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 4,499; United States v. Reese, 
92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
5 State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 at 551 (1884). The statute provided "that the sale 
of spirituous liquors shall be prohibited within three miles of • • • Mount Zion church in 
Gaston County," but there were two "Mount Zion" churches in Gaston County. 
6 Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 543, 119 N.W. 338 (1909). The statute prescribed that 
physicians must register with the ''local registrar" although there was no ''local registrar'' 
in existence. · 
7State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa 170, 170 N.W. 417 (1919). Where a statute made 
it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with a lighting device unless it cast a beam which 
"shall arise above forty-two inches from the level surface,'' the court held "failure of 
legislation" because it was clear to the court that the legislature meant "shall not." 
8 23· Mont. 229 at 241, 58 P_. 551 (1889). · 
9 Note 1 supra. 
10 The Enterprise, (C.C. N.Y. 1810) 8 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 4,499; United States v. 
Sharp, (C.C. Pa. 1815) 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, No. 16,264; James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 
23 S.Ct. 678 (1903). 
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has been placed on constitutional provisions to support findings of 
invalidity. The reasons for this are understandable. In the first place, 
the individual contesting the statute usually places his objections on 
constitutional grounds. Not only does this assure that the issue will be 
properly considered, but it also allows a double-barreled attack, since 
the court must invariably decide whether the statute is definite enough 
to be interpreted. In addition, this is the only means of raising a federal 
question as to a state statute, enabling an appeal to the federal courts. 
While the courts speak of the notice given to the individual by the 
terms of a statute in voiding it for vagueness, this reference is not placed 
in a constitutional context and seems to be present when any statute is 
being interpreted or applied.11 It is doubtful, therefore, whether it can 
be assumed that the courts are tacitly considering constitutional due 
process in these discussions. On the other hand, the constitutional test 
of indefiniteness is in general broad enough to include the test of judi-
cial indefiniteness, since ordinarily a statute which: is too vague to be 
applied or interpreted by the courts is too indefinite to give adequate 
notice to the persons to whom it is addressed.12 Finally, despite the 
validity of the judicial definiteness approach, this common law doctrine 
is basically addressed to the court's discretion, and the court usually 
finds it more convenient to base its decision on the broader and more 
concrete constitutional test. 
B. The Constitutional Requirement of Adequate Notice. The 
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Federal Constitution and similar provisions in state constitutions13 are 
the source of the requirement that a statute must be definite enough 
to allow the persons to whom it is addressed to determine the standard 
of conduct prescribed by the statute so that they can govern their actions 
accordingly.14 Connally -v. General Construction Co. laid down the 
llSee McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340 (1931), where notice to 
the individual was discussed in refusing to apply a criminal statute because of the ejusdem 
generis construction canon. The idea of notice is implicit in every canon and aid to inter-
pretation and application of a statute, and is necessarily involved in any consideration of 
them. 
12 Conceivably, there could be cases where sufficient notice is given by the terms of 
the statute although the statute is too indefinite for the court to apply. This would be 
because of the presence of some factor that would require less notice to be given to the 
individual. See note 56 infra. 
1s Only decisions of the federal courts will be considered for the remainder of the 
comment. 
14 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921) (pro-
hibiting the exaction of "unjust or unreasonable" charges for "necessaries"); International 
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853 (1914) (combination for the 
purpose or having the effect of fixing a price greater or less than the real value of an 
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often cited15 standard of this requirement in holding that a statute is 
too indefinite if it "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application .... "16 The real difficulty comes 
in determining whether this test of lack of adequate notice17 makes the 
statute inapplicable only as to the specific parties before the court or 
makes the statute completely void.18 Until very recently the United 
article made unlawful); A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 
45 S.Ct. 295 (1925) (same provisions of the Lever Act as were involved in United States 
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 
126 (1926) (criminal to pay state employees "less than the current rate of per diem wages 
in the locality where the work is performed"); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 
46 S.Ct. 619 (1926) (unlawful to keep business account books in other than the English 
or Spanish languages); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931) 
(felonious to display red Hag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized 
government or as an invitation • • • to anarchistic action"); Champlin Refining Co. v. 
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1932) (unlawful for 
oil wells to be used so tpat there is "waste" or "conditions constituting waste"); Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937) ("any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, 
to induce others to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State 
shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection"); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 
59 S.Ct. 618 (1939) (subjecting to punishment as "gangsters" any person "not engaged 
in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more 
members, who has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who 
has been convicted of any crime ••. "); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 
(1940) (unlawful to "go near to or loiter about the premises ••• of any other person ••• 
in business ••• for the purpose of hindering, delaying or interfering with or injuring any 
lawful business"); Rutledge, J., concurring in United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 at 
129, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948) (Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, makes unlawful 
expenditures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections); Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948) (ban of printed matter "devoted to ••• criminal 
news ••• accounts of criminal deeds ••• or ••• bloodshed, lust or crime"); Black, J., 
concurring in United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 at 452, 74 S.Ct. 190 
(1953) (requiring dealers to report "all sales and deliveries of gambling devices ••• "). 
15Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 
(1951). But this does not mean that a statute cannot place a burden of judgment on 
those affected. In Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 at 377, 33 S.Ct. 780 (1913), 
Justice Holmes stated that "the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his 
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree." 
Cf. Tozer v. United States, (C.C. Mo. 1892) 52 F. 917. Moreover, the cases are in 
agreement that words with well-established common law meaning are definite enough 
regardless of whether men of "common intelligence" would differ as to their meaning. See 
note 54 infra. Perhaps the answer is that laymen are presumed to know the law and thus 
men of "common intelligence" should not differ. 
16 269 U.S. 385 at 391, 46 S.Ct. 126 (1926). 
17 Although it is doubtful in many instances that a statute is consulted for guidance, 
the statute must be certain enough in its terms to put those affected on warning so that 
legal counsel may advise with reasonable certainty in the event that it is consulted. 
18 As contrasted with complete invalidation of the statute when a court decides that 
a statute is too indefinite to apply [United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189 
(1952)], theoretically there is merely a refusal to apply the statute when it is held too 
indefinite on "due process" grounds; the court decides solely on its constitutionality as to 
person(s) before the court. See Crawford, "Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional 
Statute," 49 MxcH, L. Rllv. 645 at 647 (1951). 
1954] CoMMENTS 269 
States Supreme Court has felt that the issue of indefiniteness19 "squarely 
raises the question of whether the section invoked in the indictment 
is void in toto, barring all further actions under it, in this, and every 
other case."20 Thus, even a person who could not reasonably have any 
doubt of his violation of a statute's terms may use the shield of indefi-
niteness21 if the statute could possibly fail to give reasonable notice to 
another hypothetical person in some hypothetical situation. This seems 
to have been the case in Winters 11. New York, where the majority 
admitted that there was "nothing of any possible value to society in 
these magazines,"22 but decided that the statute making criminal th€ 
sale of publications in which accounts of ''bloodshed, lust or crime" 
were so massed as to incite to crimes of violence was "void, on its face."23 
This concept, which was subjected to severe criticism in Justice 
Murphy's dissent in Screws 11. United States,24 seems to have been 
rejected in Williams 11. United States.25 There the statute in question26 
was held to be definite enough to be applied to the defendant before 
the Court even though the Court conceded that a case might arise 
where the language would be too indefinite to give the requisite notice 
and would thus be inapplicable.27 If, as this case indicates, indefinite-
ness is an individual matter, lack of notice and vagueness as to the 
persons before the court should be pleaded and proved in order to raise 
the constitutional objection. The ·issue is not settled, however, for Jus-
tice Black appears to have adhered, in his concurring opinion in United 
19 It would seem that only the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would be involved 
in ascertaining whether a statute is sufficiently definite, but the Supreme Court has held 
that a statute which fails to give notice also violates the Sixth Amendment provision that 
the accused shall have the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 
Yu Cong Eng v._ Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 46 S.Ct. 619 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921). The rationale of these decisions seems 
to be that accusation under a vague statute is no accusation at all. It is submitted that this 
is an incorrect application of the Sixth Amendment. That provision is commonly thought 
to prevent detention without charge, not to establish any scale of definiteness for Congress. 
20 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 at 5-6, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947). 
21 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 61 S.Ct. 429 (1941). But cf. 29 CAr.m. L. 
Rav. 548 (1941). 
22 333 U.S. 507 at 510, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). 
23 Cf. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion. Id. at 520. 
24 325 U.S. 91 at 134, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). 
2:; 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 376 (1951). 
26 18 U.S.C. (1952) §242, making it a crime for any person, under color of any law, 
to subject any inhabitant "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States •••• " The same 
statute was involved in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). 
27 "Many criminal statutes might be extended to circumstances so extreme as to make 
their application unconstitutional. • • • Some day the application of §20 to less obvious 
methods of coercion may be presented and doubts as to the adequacy of the standard of 
guilt may be presented •••• " Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 at 101, 71 S.Ct. 
576 (1951). 
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States v. Five Gambling Devices28 and his dissenting opinion in Edel-
man v. California,29 to the principle of total invalidation for vagueness 
enunciated in the Winters case. The basic question seems to be whether 
or not a person should be allowed to assert vagueness as a defense with-
out some indication that he actually consulted the statute with a view 
toward compliance. Justice Clark, dissenting in United States v. Five 
Gambling Devices, has indicated that he is opposed to Justice Black's 
approach by stating: 
" ... with or without the regulations, a person honestly seeking 
to comply with this law would inevitably have succeeded, without 
undue mental strain in determining the statute's import and with-
out uncertainty as to his chances of remaining within the bounds 
of the law. The certainty required by the Due Process Clause 
is not tested from the would-be violator's standpoint; the test is 
rather whether adequate guidance is given to those who would be 
law-abiding. "30 
IL Factors Varying the Degree of Definiteness Required 
A. The Means by Which a Statute is Executed. It is clear that 
the standards of a self-executing statute must in and of themselves give 
notice to the individual as to what is demanded of him. While he is 
expected to use various aids, both intrinsic and extrinsic, in interpreting 
the standards set out, and may even be charged with knowledge of a 
subsequent interpretation of the statute, he need look no farther than 
the statute itself for the words that are to be considered. 31 On the 
other hand, it has been asserted that less definiteness is required of an 
administratively executed statute,32 the sole requisite being that the 
basic standards set up must be sufficiently definite and precise to enable 
those affected to determine whether the administrator or quasi-legis-
lative board is exceeding his or its authority in promulgating a regula-
tion under the statute.33 Distinct from this problem of meeting the 
2s 346 U.S. 441, 74 S.Ct. 190 (1953). 
20 344 U.S. 357 at 362, 73 S.Ct. 293 (1953). 
30 346 U.S. 441 at 458, 74 S.Ct. 190 (1953). Chief Justice Warren and Justices 
Burton and Reed concurred in Justice Clark's dissenting opinion. 
31 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). Cf. Fox v. Washing-
ton, 236 U.S. 273, 35 S.Ct. 383 (1915). See Horack, "Cooperative Action for Improved 
Statutory Interpretation," 3 V .ANDERIIILT L. Rnv. 382 (1950). 
32 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283 (1924). 
33 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 at 426, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944), where the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. L. 23 (1942), was upheld against charges 
of legislative delegation because its standards were "sufficiently definite and precise to 
enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator in 
fixing the designated prices, has conformed to those standards." The statute allowed the 
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definiteness requirements of the due process clause is the problem of 
satisfying the demands of the constitutional separation of powers con-
cept. In legislative delegation this requires statutory specification of 
the basic policies and rules of c-0nduct of the quasi-legislative body.34 
The quasi-legislative body may be given policy and rule-making powers 
only within the limits established by the legislature. The regulations 
so established by a quasi-legislative body are typically prospective in 
effect and are subject to the same due process definiteness requirements 
as self-executing statutes.35 
If statutes creating administrative agencies performing quasi-judi-
cial functions are treated as subject only to the same test as statutes 
creating quasi-legislative agencies,36 then there is no definiteness re-
quirement as such, and the only requisite is a standard by which the 
agency can guide its actions.37 There is a serious question whether such 
statutes should not be subject to the same requirements of definiteness 
demanded of self-executing statutes,38 since they are in effect self-
executing statutes with boards rather than courts sitting as the enforce-
Administrator to set "fair and equitable" prices. Compare United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921), where the self-executing Lever Act, 40 
Stat. L. 277 (1917), as amended by 41 Stat. L. 298 (1919), which prohibited "unjust 
or unreasonable rate of charge," was held unconstitutional. 
34 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 
52 S.Ct. 559 (1932); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944); United 
States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 S.Ct. 42 (1932); Opp Cotton 
Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524 (1941); Norwegian Nitrogen v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S.Ct. 350 (1933); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 
506, 31 S.Ct. 480 (1911); Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 
53 S.Ct. 627 (1933). Cf. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 
(1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935). 
35A search of the federal courts of appeals and United States Supreme Court cases 
fails to reveal any instance in which a federal administrative regulation of a quasi-legislative 
board itself was held unconstitutional for indefiniteness. Perhaps the regulations are clari-
fied if they are contested on vagueness grounds and thus few, if any, reach the lower 
courts. Note the "clarifying" Treasury Regulations of the Treasury Department which are 
a binding construction of the Internal Revenue Code, unless in conflict with the statute. 
36 See Freund, ''The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes," 30 YALB L.J. 437 (1921). 
37 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283 (1924); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FfC, 
(7th Cir. 1919) 258 F. 307; FfC v. A. McLean & Son, (7th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 910; 
Arkansas Wholesaler· Grocers' Assn. v. FfC, (8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 866; FfC v. 
Balme, (2d Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 615; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997 (1943). 
as In FfC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 at 312, 54 S.Ct. 423 (1934), it was 
stated: "Congress, in defining the powers of the Commission, thus advisedly adopted a 
phrase ["unfair methods of competition"] which, as this Court has said, does not 'admit 
of precise definition but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what 
this Court elsewhere has called the "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."'" 
Perhaps this idea of continuing "inclusion and exclusion" is valid as to constitutional pro-
visions and provisions of statutes creating quasi-legislative boards, but as to statutes which 
are self-executing or create quasi-judicial boards, it seems to be a process of continuing 
legislation, being applied retroactively. However, in certain circumstances general language 
will be definite enough even where the statute is self-executing. See part C infra. 
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ment agencies.39 Quasi-judicial administrators pass judgments which, 
though rarely penal, often have severe economic and political conse-
quences and concern precedent acts for which no precise guidance was 
given by the statute. 40 The courts seemingly fail to see the difference 
between a sanction imposed for precedent conduct, even though it 
operates prospectively,41 and a regulation prohibiting certain prescribed 
future conduct.42 In the former there may be loss of freedom or pro~ 
erty as a result of the administrator's decision; in the latter the action 
of the administrator, while it may operate to curtail activities, is similar 
to the passage of a statute rather than the judgment of a court. 
B. Enforcement Provisions of the Statute. Many decisions imply 
that a higher degree of definiteness is required in criminal statutes 
than in civil statutes by stressing the fact that the statute being invali-
dated is criminal in nature. 43 However, the actual decisions do not 
appear to bear this distinction out. As was stated by the Court in A. B. 
Small Co. 11. American Tobacco, in rejecting the Lever Act as a defense 
in a contract action after· the act had been held unconstitutional in 
United States :v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.44 and Weeds, Inc. 11. United 
States,415 
"The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as to 
be applicable only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the crim-
inal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to 
a rule or standard which was so 11ague and indefinite as really to 
be no rule or standard at all."46 
so Those affected have no more to guide them than they have where the statute is 
self-executing. Some courts seem to feel that the statutes are as definite as self-executing 
statutes. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1919) 258 F. 307, where the 
statute was compared with penal statutes, and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 at 40, 44 S.Ct. 
283 (1924), where it was said: "Our history has created a common understanding of the 
words 'undesirable residents' which gives them the quality of a recognized standard." 
40 Civil "cease and desist" orders for "unfair methods of competition" are decreed by 
the Federal Trade Commission. Deportation can be ordered by the Secretary of Labor for 
aliens if they are found to be "undesirable citizens," according to Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 
32, 44 S.Ct. 283 (1924). 
41 The Supreme Court distinguishes between prospective sanctions and sanctions for 
acts done which subject one to loss of liberty or property, but it regards the decree of a 
quasi-judicial administrator as prospective as long as it does not directly affect title or 
liberty. The Court requires a higher degree of definiteness in a statute directly affecting 
liberty or property. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 
U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1932). 
42 See cases cited in notes 34 and 37 supra. 
48 See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Tennessee, (C.C. Tenn. 
1884) 19 F. 679, where a statute imposing multiple damages for violation was termed 
"quasi-criminal," thus allowing the court to talk in terms of the high degree of definiteness 
required in a criminal statute. 
44 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921). 
45 255 U.S. 109, 41 S.Ct. 306 (1921). 
46 A. B, Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 at 239, 45 S.Ct. 
295 (1925). Emphasis added. See also United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 at 267, 47 
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General wording has been held sufficiently definite in both crim-
inal and civil cases, with the real emphasis placed not on the type of 
enforcement, but rather on incidental factors making the language 
more definite. The use of the distinction, if any exists, seems to be as 
a support for a decision already reached. No logical basis can be found 
for such a distinction, since notice to the persons affected may be 
equally as important in one case as in the other. It might even be 
argued that it is more important in the case of civil statutes, since such 
statutes are more often looked to for guidance before the act47 than are 
criminal statutes.48 Nevertheless, the courts do give lip service to the 
criminal-civil distinction, and although no case has been discovered 
where it is clear that this distinction was actually determinative, it per-
haps is helpful in making the court receptive to more important 
factors.49 
C. The Subject Matter. The type of subject matter dealt with in 
a statute plays an important part in the degree of definiteness required. 
The Supreme Court indicated in United States 11. Petrillo50 that a 
statute is definite enough if it is as definite as Congress could reason-
ably make it with due regard to the subject matter. Yet in Winters v. 
New York51 the statute appeared to satisfy the Petrillo test and still it 
was held to be too vague. Perhaps the difference in the activity con-
trolled by the statutes is the reconciling element. The Petrillo case 
dealt with union persuasion devices and the Winters case concerned 
publication of certain types of reading matter. With the reverence 
paid the right of free expression, a higher degree of definiteness has 
been required in statutes limiting that right.52 Where less important 
S.Ct. 597 (1927), where Justice Holmes stated: ''We regard the meaning as too plain to 
be shaken by the suggestion that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. They also 
are to be construed with common sense." 
47 This proposition would not be true of criminal statutes governing commercial trans-
actions, e.g., tax and price-fixing statutes. 
48 E.g., which would require greater definiteness in its standards, a "criminal" statute 
imposing a five dollar fine for breaches of the peace, or the federal antitrust act, a "civil" 
statute awarding threefold damages? See 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
49 An additional factor might perhaps be the culpability of the conduct. See Hall, 
"Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes," 48 HA:n.v. L. REv. 748 (1935). Cf. note 
56 infra. 
50 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947). "Clearer and more precise language might have 
been framed by Congress to express what it meant by 'number of employees needed.' But 
none occurs to us, nor has any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what 
appears to have been the Congressional purpose.'' Id. at 7. See United States v. Alford, 
274 U.S. 264, 47 S.Ct. 597 (1927); Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507 at 520, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). 
51333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). 
52 There is some indication that there is not only a difference in the degree of definite-
ness required in a statute limiting the right of free discussion, but also a difference in kind. 
See 1949 Wis. L. REv. 359, in which the writer claims that there is a presumption of 
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rights are involved, the Petrillo test of reasonable definiteness may well 
be applicable.53 
D. Incidental Factors. Various other factors are frequently cited 
by the courts in support of their decisions in this area, though it is diffi-
cult to determine the precise effect, other than as makeweights, that 
they have independent of more significant considerations. These inci-
dental factors may be briefly summarized: 
I. Words in the statute which have a well-settled common law 
or technical meaning are deemed sufficiently de6.nite.64 
2. A statute which extends or declares the common law is required 
to have less definiteness than a statute that contemplates a change in 
existing laws. 55 
unconstitutionality where a statute deals with free speech. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88 at 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940), seems to express the philosophy of the courts when 
dealing with statutes in this area: "The existence of such a statute, which readily lends 
itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by· local, prosecuting officials • • • results in 
a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be 
regarded as within its purview .••• Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are 
concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not 
the accusation or evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissive conduct and 
warns against transgression." See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U:S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 
(1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937). Cf. Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 573, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942), where a statute prohibiting 
indecent language was upheld with the court emphasizing the fact that it was "narrowly 
drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct. • • ." In certain cases where the 
public need for free speech restriction is great and the enforcement provisions are well 
defined, the statutes will not be subjected to this tremendous burden of definiteness which 
exists where the public interest is not so immediate, e.g., control of radio transmitters by 
the Federal Communications Commission and of public broadcasting by the so-called 
''loudspeaker" ordinances. See Jackson, J., dissenting in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 
at 566, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948), and concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 97, 69 
S.Ct. 448 (1949). 
53This is suggested in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 517, 68 S.Ct. 665 
(1948): "This court goes far to uphold state statutes that deal with offenses, difficult to 
define, when they are not entwined with limitations on free expression. We have the 
same attitude toward federal statutes." Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 
70 S.Ct. 674 (1950), indicates that this attitude will not be extended into the civil rights 
field generally. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1951), allowed the 
arrest of a street orator expressing inflammatory, "unpopular" views under a statute pro-
hibiting incitement of breaches of the peace. But cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 
71 S.Ct. 312 (1951), and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951), 
in which convictions under licensing statutes were struck down because no appropriate 
standards were established for the granting of the public speaking permits. 
54 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945); Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 
497, 45 S.Ct. 141 (1925); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 S.Ct. 323 (1918). 
The technical meaning must be one "well settled" among the group to whom the statute is 
directed. . 
65 Compare Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S.Ct. 780 (1913), with United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). The modem judicial philosophy of encouraging 
experimental legislation would tend to modify Chief Justice Waite's theory of restrictive 
interpretation, expressed in the Reese case. See the dissents in Winters v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948). 
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3. A statute that requires the presence of culpable intent· on the 
part of the person affected necessitates less definiteness than a statute 
which prescribes or proscribes the execution of an act regardless of 
intent.66 
4. Language that has been amplified and elaborated by adminis-
trators' rulings,67 legal department opinions,68 and lower court deci-
sions59 need not be as definite as that considered for the first time by 
the court. 
5. Lengthy administration of a statute with many adjudications 
upholding its validity seems to decrease the need for definiteness. 60 
6. A statute that requires those affected to make a finding of fact 
based on hypothetical factors must be very definite.61 
66 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945); Gorin v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 19, 61 S.Ct. 429 (1941); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 62 S.Ct. 
374 (1942); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 45 S.Ct. 141 (1925); 
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 at 348, 38 S.Ct. 323 (1918), where it was said 
that " ••• any danger ••• which might otherwise arise from indefiniteness, is removed" 
by the existence of a general statute requiring intent. Is intent to do an indefinite act any 
intent at all? Does not this holding leave the meaning of the statute up to the jury? It 
should be remembered in considering these cases that in every one the Court said the 
language was definite enough and only then discussed the fact that intent was required. 
There is also some feeling on the part of the courts that if one could not prevent his 
misconduct even though he knew of the statute, or would commit the offense regardless 
of knowledge, less definiteness is required in the statute dealing with the misconduct-
e.g., statutes dealing with homosexuals or homicides. See Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 
U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523 (1940); Murphy, J., dissenting in Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91 at 134, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). 
57 FfC v. R.· F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 54 S.Ct. 423 (1934); United States v. 
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 S.Ct. 42 (1932). Cf. Justice Black's 
concurring opinion in United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 at 452, 74 
S.Ct. 190 (1953). 
68 United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 47 S.Ct. 597 (1927). 
~o Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 35 S.Ct. 383 (1915); United States v. Alford, 
274 U.S. 264, 47 S.Ct. 597 (1927); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 29 
S.Ct. 220 (1909). 
60 "Section 5 has so often been considered and held to be constitutional by the courts 
that it is not necessary now to consider these objections [one was that the statute was 
indefinite] to its constitutionality." FfC v. Balme, (2d Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 615 at 621. 
This statement seems to ignore the fact that under the adversary system a statute is only 
declared unconstitutional as to the person contesting. However, perhaps the other cases 
involved similar persons and stare decisis came into play or perhaps the court felt that many 
previous decisions involving different facts clarified the statute. See note 53 supra. The 
dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 520 et seq., 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948), 
suggests that lengthy administration of a statute without attack will in itself decrease the 
need for definiteness, but this view seems unsupported. 
01 In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 at 223, 34 S.Ct. 853 
(1914), a price-fixing statute was held too indefinite not because the language itself was 
indefinite but because "the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncer-
tain both in nature and degree of effect to the acutest commercial mind." 
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III. Conclusions 
[ Vol. 53 
A majority of the cases, regardless of the theory used, consider (I) 
the notice given to the individuals affected by the terms of the statute, 
(2) the ability of the court to understand the statute, and (3) the 
ingredients in the statute and any other elements present which may 
vary the degree of definiteness required or which may make the statute 
more definite. It is after these factors are considered that the theories 
come into operation. If judicial definiteness is the standard applied, 
the second factor is emphasized; if constitutional due process definite-
ness is the test, primary importance is placed on the first factor.62 
When the two theories are considered in this light, they appear to be 
consistent, not conflicting, with the difference being in the point on 
which primary stress is laid. The reason that the two theories, as 
applied in the cases, seem inconsistent is that a vague statute almost 
invariably neither gives notice to the individual nor is definite enough 
for a court to apply.63 Confronted with exactly the same situation, 
therefore, different courts may strike down a statute on different 
grounds, without even discussing the alternative theory. But this 
simply means that a court is faced with a choice between two correct 
tests, both of which must be satisfied before the statute can be applied. 
Thus as a practical matter the third factor-the one varying the degree 
of definiteness needed or present in any particular case-becomes of 
primary importance. Consequently, all factors which could possibly 
clarify the language used in the statute should be uncovered and care-
fully weighed. 
Robert B. Krueger, S.Ed. 
62 Sometimes, however, the courts appear to rest their decisions on dual grounds. 
Compare 51 MrCH. L. REv. 922 (1953), in which United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 
73 S.Ct. 189 (1952), is discussed from the standpoint of constitutional due process; with 
51 MrcH. L. REv. 941 (1953), in which the same case is analyzed as a development in 
the field of statutory interpretation. 
63 Some writers seem to agree with the proposition that both the court and the indi-
viduals affected must be able to understand the statute's terms, but regard the requirement 
as one of due process as to both parties. See 62 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948). To put a court 
within the protection of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments involves, of course, a 
remarkable chain of reasoning. 
